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RECOVERY OF DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSS:
THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF
OHIO PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Increasingly, courts are allowing recovery of economic loss in products liablity
cases. This recovery is generally premised on one of two doctrines-strict tort liabil-
ity or contract recovery under the UCC. The courts of Ohio, however, appear to be
deciding these cases upon a hybrid of the two theories; if the parties are in privity,
recovery is based upon the Code, but if recovery is sought from a remote manufac-
turer, tort theory is invoked. This Note explores the various theories, their
rationales, and their ramifications by examining a recent Ohio Supreme Court case,
Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
WHEN BUYERS PURCHASE products that prove to be defective, they
often seek recovery in the courts. Initially they may turn to the re-
tailer from whom they purchased the product, but buyers may also seek
recompense from the remote manufacturer of the defective product.' The
manufacturer's liability for defective products that cause personal injury2 is
unquestioned today, but the extent of a remote manufacturer's liability for
economic loss 3 continues to be uncertain. 4 When courts allow recovery of
1. A defectively manufactured product is one which is not fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such articles are sold and used because of a flaw in the design or manufacture of the
product. Compare Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 89-90, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69
(1970), with Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"
Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. llxv. 539 (1966).
2. As used throughout this Note, the term personal injury includes: (1) time losses, for
which the plaintiff can recover lost earnings; (2) medical expenses incurred because of the in-
jury; and (3) loss caused by pain and suffering.
3. In this context, economic loss refers only to purely pecuniary damage as opposed to
physical injury to property or persons. Where a manufacturer and purchaser are in contractual
privity, economic loss is recoverable on the contract. See, e.g., Boylston Hous. Corp. v.
O'Toole, 321 Mass. 538, 74 N.E.2d 288 (1947). Economic loss is more precisely defined in text
accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter UCC] section 2-714 (3) also provides for
recovery of economic loss between parties in privity for breach of warranty: "In a proper case
any incidental and consequential damages . . . may . . . be recovered." Incidental and conse-
quential damages are defined in UCC section 2-715. See notes 23-28 infra and accompanying
text.
4. Generally, courts have not awarded economic loss damages to purchasers who are not in
privity with the manufacturer of a negligently constructed product. See, e.g., Gherna v. Ford
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economic loss damages, they premise the recovery upon either contractual
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 5 or the judicially de-
veloped theory of strict tort liability, 6 but which theory is preferable remains
an unanswered question. Although economic loss arises from the same prod-
uct defects for which the strict tort liability theory for personal injury was
developed, economic loss also arises in the commercial context for which the
UCC was designed to provide uniformity-the amount of economic loss sus-
tained depends upon the provisions of the particular purchase agreement
that controls the sale.
It is the societal and economic ramifications of liability for direct
economic loss that should determine which theory courts will apply. In
order to make these determinations, it is necessary to examine the origins of
strict liability and the substance of the alternative theories of recovery. Spec-
ifically, this Note will show that as a result of Iacono v. Anderson Concrete
Corp.7 -- the first Ohio Supreme Court decision allowing recovery from a
remote manufacturer for economic loss on an "implied tort warranty"'8 -and
other products liability cases, 9 Ohio courts use the concept of privity to de-
termine whether product-caused damages are recoverable under strict tort
or under the UCC.
The facts of Iacono are simple. During the spring of 1969, Thomas
Iacono entered into an oral agreement with the Padovan Construction Con-
Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966); Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157
Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d
423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956); A.J.P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 283 N.Y.
692, 28 N.E.2d 412 (1940); Amodeo v. Autocraft Hudson, Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1959), aff'd,
12 App. Div. 2d 499, 207 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1960); TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477,
148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546, appeal denied, 2
App. Div. 2d 745, 157 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1956); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d
132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). See also W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102,
at 667 (4th ed. 1971); Shapo, Keeton and the Revolution in Products Liability Law: Toward
Stability, A Quest for Fairness, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1065 (1974); Note, Products Liability Jurispru-
dence, 66 COLUM, L. REv. 917 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Products Liability Jurisprudence].
5. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Rhodes
Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). See notes 235-51 infra and
accompanying text.
6. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); cf. Ford Motor
Co. v. London, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966) (remote manufacturer of defective product held
liable for commercial loss to buyer who relied upon manufacturer's booklets and trademark in
making purchase). Economic loss has also been recovered under an implied warranty in tort,
which has been equated with strict tort liability. See, e.g., Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201
So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965). See notes
66-75 infra and accompanying text.
7. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
8. The Ohio Supreme Court mistakenly labeled Iacono's damage as property damage
rather than economic loss. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 169-233 infra.
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pany for the installation of a driveway, a patio, and a sidewalk at Iacono's
residence.1 0 The project was completed by Padovan's employees with con-
crete obtained by Padovan from the Anderson Concrete Corporation."1 Im-
perfections in the concrete resulted in "pop-outs" and considerable surface
scaling in the concrete when the weather changed. 12 Because these prob-
lems were not corrected, Iacono brought an action against both Padovan (the
intermnediary) and Anderson (the remote manufacturer) for breach of express
and implied warranties that the "finished driveway would be fit for its cus-
tomary and normal use." 13 In the court of common pleas, the jury returned
a verdict against both Padovan and Anderson in the amount of
$13,000.14 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against Padovan, but,
because of the absence of privity of contract, reversed the judgment against
Anderson. 15 The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, allowed recovery from
Anderson in tort for breach of an implied warranty. 16
Even -after the lacono decision, it is unknown whether economic loss
may be recovered solely in tort in Ohio because the court failed to address
certain key issues. First, the court failed to recognize that the plaintiff in
Iacono was seeking compensation for economic loss, not property damage, as
that measure of recovery has traditionally been applied in tort.17 Second,
the lacono court ignored specific provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, as enacted by the Ohio legislature, 18 which should govern commercial
transactions in which economic loss arises. Because of the lacono decision, a
reevaluation of the present status of products liability law in Ohio must be
undertaken.
A. Iacono's Loss Was Economic
Although it has not always been tnse,19 current law permits the retail
10. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 88, 326 N.E.2d 267, 268 (1975).
11. Id.
12. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court described the pop-outs as "small round holes." These
imperfections created hollow areas in the concrete which weakened the stnhcture of the drive-
way.
13. Id. at 90, 326 N.E.2d at 269.
14. id. at 89, 326 N.E.2d at 268.
15. The Court of Appeals of Franklin County originally reversed the judgment against the
Anderson Concrete Corporation because the plaintiff's complaint "sounded primarily in contract
and failed to allege a tortious act which caused damages." Id. at 89, 326 N.E.2d at 268. Upon a
motion for reconsideration by Iacono, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment against Pado-
van and, stressing a lack of privity between lacono and the remote manufacturer Anderson,
adhered to its judgment in favor of Anderson.
16. Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 271.
17. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
18. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1301.01 through 1309.50 (Page 1962).
19. Historically, liability for a defectively manufactured product was premised upon the re-
lationship between the manufacturer and the injured party. When the manufacturer and the
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purchaser of a defective product to maintain a cause of action against the
manufacturer with whom he is not in privity. Compensation is recoverable
from remote manufacturers for product-caused damage to the purchaser's
property, 20 for his personal injuries, 21 and for economic losses. 22
When economic loss is caused by a defective product, it may be termed
either direct or consequential. Direct economic loss-the central focus of
this Note-results from a product's decreased value due to a defect. 23 One
measure of direct economic loss is the "loss of the value of the bargain" or
the difference between the actual value of the defective product and the
value it would have if it were fit for its intended use.24 For example, if the
purchaser of an automobile sticker-priced at $5,000 pays the dealer $3,700
for the car, but it is only worth $2,200 with the defect, the loss on the
bargain is $2,800. "Out-of-pocket expense" is the other measure of direct
economic loss. The difference between the purchase price of the product
and the value of the product with the defect represents the out-of-pocket
expense.2 5 For example, the difference between the purchase price ($3,700)
and the value of the car with the defect ($2,200) indicates the out-of-pocket
expense in the above example is $1,500. Costs that are incurred to repair a
defective product and expenditures which must be absorbed to replace a
product that cannot be repaired are also direct out-of-pocket economic
losses. 26
Indirect, as opposed to direct, economic losses arise as a consequence of
the defect rather than from diminution of the value of the product pur-
chased. Such consequential economic losses include the value of production
claimant were in contractual privity, the claimant, as a direct purchaser, could recover compen-
sation for personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. However, if the claimant
purchased the product from a retailer, or some other intermediary, the claimant was unable to
recover for his or her damages because of the common law rule which barred recovery when
there was no privity between the manufacturer and the claimant. Because strict adherence to
the doctrine of privity led to inequitable results, numerous exceptions developed which qual-
ffied the privity requirement in products liability suits. See note 73 infra.
20. See, e.g., Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958).
21. See, e.g., Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
22. See, e.g., Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
See also notes 42-45 infra and accompanying text.
23. See generally Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products
Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. Rlv. 145 (1972); Products
Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4; Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers
for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 539 (1966).
24. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); San-
tor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
25. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Inglis v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
26. See Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 918.
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time lost due to a defective product, lost labor time, 2 7 and lost profits. 28
When a defective product causes personal injury to the purchaser, the
remote manufacturer may be held liable under either the UCC 29 or under a
theory of strict liability in tort.3 0 Historically, however, the remote manufac-
turer has not always been held liable under tort theories for damage occur-
ring to the defective product itself. Property damage, which occurs if a de-
fective product causes a violent "catastrophic" accident, 3' is recoverable in
tort.3 2 Accidental damage to the purchased article itself is includable within
this tort concept of property damage.a 3 On the other hand, if the defect is
manifested by deterioration of the product or a similar nonviolent occur-
rence, the damage to the product is economic loss.3 Nonviolent damage to
27. Otis Elevator Co. v. Standard Constr. Co., 92 F. Supp. 603 (D. Minn. 1950) (cost of
heat, light, and power for unused hospital rooms, the additional cost of labor for hospital opera-
tions, and the additional cost of construction which resulted from alleged delay by defendant in
installing elevators were consequential damages).
28. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
29. A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1962) (emphasis added). This is the statutory enactment
of section 2-318, Alternative A, of the UCC. See Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970);
Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 292 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Singer v. Walker, 331 N.Y.S.2d
823, 39 App. Div. 2d 90 (1972). See also Epstein, Personal Injuries From Defective Products-
Some "Dots and Dashes," 9 Alsz. L. REv. 163 (1967); Rapson, Products Liability Under and
Beyond the Code, 2 U.C.C.L.J. 315 (1970); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1970); 16 VILL. L. 11Ev. 202 (1970).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
See Carmichael, Strict Liability in Torts-An Explosion in Products Liability Law, 20 DRAKE L.
REv. 528 (1971); Titus, supra note 29; Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in
Tort, 22 ARu. L. REv. 233 (1968); Strict Liability: Public Policy Which Protects the User or
Consumer Also Protects The Bystander, 42 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 218 (1972).
31. See Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958).
32. See, e.g., Cherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966);
Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Polden Eng'r & Mfg.
Co. v. Zell Elec. Mfg. Co., 1 Misc. 2d 1016, 156 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1955). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965); Seavey, Actions for Economic Harm-A Com-
ment, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1242 (1957); Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4.
33. Cherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 54 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966); see C.D.
Herme, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
34. Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 918.
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the property that was purchased is not includable within the tort concept of
property damage. Recovery for such economic damage has traditionally been
limited to contractual remedies. 35
In Iacono the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the decision of the jury that
the concrete sold by' Anderson was defective because it should not have
contained the "soft shale aggregates" that caused the damage to the concrete
driveway. 36 Consequently, Iacono was compensated for damage to the con-
crete which was the object of the bargain with the remote manufacturer.
The supreme court concluded that "a defective product ... caused [the
plaintiff] to suffer property damage rather than personal injury." 37 This con-
clusion is inconsistent with the commonly accepted definition of property
damage. Since there was no accident or catastrophic occurrence, Iacono's
loss would have been properly described as direct economic loss rather than
property damage. Thus, although direct economic loss has not traditionally
been recoverable in tort, the court in Iacono, in effect, used a tort theory to
award economic loss compensation. This departure from traditional law was
not addressed in the opinion because the damage was mislabeled as "prop-
erty damage." 38
The traditional limitations upon recovery of economic loss in tort indicate
the uniqueness of the Iacono holding. Where the purchaser of a defective
product is not in privity with the manufacturer, many courts have said that
the threat of personal injury will not afford recovery in tort of economic
35. See, e.g., Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958) (the
need to prove negligence and the requirement that the damage be the result of an "accident"
would prevent such an action from intruding upon a field traditionally treated in warranty law).
See also W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 665 n.38.
36. 42 Ohio St. 2d at 92-93, 326 N.E.2d at 270.
37. Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 270.
38. Id. A federal district court in Texas recognized that Iacono had allowed tort recovery for
economic loss. See Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288,
292-93 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
The distinction between property damage and economic loss originated from the tort con-
cepts governing personal injury recovery. A manufacturer's liability to a purchaser with whom
he was not in privity was traditionally limited in tort to situations in which product defects
caused personal injury. For example, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916), Justice Cardozo limited a remote manufacturer's product liability to situations
in which a defective product created an unreasonable danger of personal inju'ry. Id. Even when
courts began to further extend tort liability of a remote manufacturer to liability for property
damage, the initial extension was limited to defects which threatened personal injury in con-
junction with damage to the product. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965); Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263
N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934); Marsh Wood Prods. Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis.
209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932).
Consistency necessitated this extension because the same unreasonable dangers that had
justified recovery of personal injuries caused the property damage in many of these cases.
Economic loss, however, was not usually the result of the same unreasonable dangers which led
to personal injury or property damage. Consequently, recovery of economic loss continued to
be limited to contractual remedies.
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losses unless an accident actually occurs. 39 For example, defects in an
airplane engine create the danger of a crash resulting in personal injury to
the passengers. Yet in Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,40 a
New York supreme court held that economic loss, arising from the breach of
a remote manufacturer's duty to a subpurchaser, could not be recovered 4l
because the engine defects were discovered in time to prevent an accident.
Direct economic loss is, by definition, not caused by an accident; thus,
compensation for catastrophic accidental damage to the defective product
itself would sound in tort as property damage, but never as direct economic
loss. Therefore, the requirement of a defect-caused accident effectively pre-
vents direct economic loss from being recovered in tort from a remote man-
ufacturer.
Significantly, the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court in Inglis v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp.42 had the same effect as the Trans World Airlines deci-
sion. In Inglis, the plaintiff-purchaser sought compensation for direct
economic loss from the remote manufacturer of a defective automobile; the
defect had not, however, caused an accident. Inglis based his claim on three
causes of action: (1) breach of express warranties created by the manufac-
turer through national advertising; (2) breach of implied warranties of fitness;
and (3) negligent manufacture. 4 3  The Ohio Supreme Court allowed
economic loss recovery on the basis of a breach of the express war-
ranty. 44 However, in the absence of a defect-caused accident, the court
39. See Karl's Shoe Store, Ltd. v. Universal Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D.
Mass. 1956); Amodeo v. Autocraft Hudson, inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1959), aff'd mere., 12 App.
Div. 499, 207 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1960); TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148
N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956). But see Atlas
Aluminum v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis.
2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961) (these two cases are discussed in Products Liability Jurispru-
dence, supra note 4, at 930-31).
A few cases have taken the view that the remote manufacturer or seller could be held liable
to the ultimate purchaser on the negligence theory even though there had been no violent
accident and only economic loss was claimed. Significantly, in these cases consequential dam-
ages were claimed in addition to the mere difference in value between the property as it should
have been and its value in its defective condition. Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d
805 (N.D. 1965); Spence v. Three Rivers Bldg. & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958).
The Restatement takes a similar position. Section 395 recbgnizes liability for negligent man-
ufacture only when a product threatens or in fact causes harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 395 (1965).
40. 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546
(1956).
41. Id. at 481, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 290. The plaintiff and the defendant were not in privity
because the defendant-manufacturer had sold the defective parts to the firm from which the
plaintiff purchased the assembled engine.
42. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
43. Id. at 133-34, 209 N.E.2d at 584.
44. Id. at 141, 209 N.E.2d at 588-89.
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stated that direct economic losses would not be recoverable under the negli-
gence cause of action.45
The Inglis decision, which effectively prohibits recovery of direct
economic loss under tort theory, seems, at first glance, to be inconsistent
with Iacono. Yet, the Iacono opinion cannot accurately be construed as an
intentional repudiation of Inglis. As has been mentioned, the court in Iacono
never addressed the economic loss issue, having erroneously labeled the
damage as "property damage." 4 6 Moreover, the court cited Inglis with ap-
proval. 47 Therefore, it appears that the court in Iacono did not intend to
relax the prohibition against recovery of economic loss in tort.
B. The Court Overlooked the UCC
There are different policy justifications for applying strict tort theory than
for applying UCC contract theories. The UCC embodies a legislative judg-
ment that transactions which occur in a commercial context, including those
which result in direct economic loss, should be decided according to the
Code.4 8 However, if a manufacturer is held strictly liable under tort theory
for frustrated expectations, such as direct economic loss, liability would
enure regardless of the terms of the negotiated sale. Strict tort theory
would, in effect, deprive the parties of the freedom to negotiate because
recovery in tort is not governed, and consequently not limited, by the
agreed-upon terms of the sales contract. 49 In contrast, the UCC seeks to
encourage bargaining by upholding disclaimers of liability or limitation of
remedy, both of which may affect price. Consequently, by applying the con-
tractual theory, the courts are merely fulfilling the expectations of the par-
ties, whereas tort theory ignores these expectations. The most significant
difference between the strict tort and the UCC theories, however, is the
45. Id. at 140-41, 209 N.E.2d at 588.
46. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra. The notion that the Ohio Supreme Court was
mistaken in its classification of Iacono's losses as property damage is reinforced by its opinion in
Inglis where the court distinguished between property damage and pecuniary loss: "In the case
at bar there was not any personal injury or property damage-the loss being that of a pecuniary
nature." 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 137, 209 N.E.2d 583, 586 (1965). This statement indicates that Ohio
does distinguish property damage from economic damage and that the failure to make that
distinction in Iacono was an oversight rather than a deliberate attempt to include direct
economic loss as property damage.
47. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 93, 326 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1975).
48. Article 2 of the UCC is applicable to sales. The UCC has been adopted by every state
except Louisiana.
49. The major difference between strict tort liability and the UCC treatment of economic
loss is that strict liability is not limited by disclaimers, limitations of liability, and privity of
contract. See notes 119-26 infra and accompanying text.
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warranty provisions of the sales law. 50 The UCC also subjects purchasers to
such contractual limitations as notice requirements. 5 1
Strict tort liability imposes responsibility for defective products without
proof of negligence mad without proof of a contractual relationship. 52 The
term "strict liability" evolved, in the context of products liability, to describe
the liability of the remote manufacturer for personal injury caused by his
defective product.53 Strict liability in tort is substantively identical to the
predecessor tort action for breach of implied warranty. 54 However, the lat-
ter cause of action may be maintained against a remote manufacturer only to
receive compensation for personal injuries caused by a defective prod-
uct.55 The use of the term "implied warranty" has been curtailed to avoid
association with contractual limitations and the subsequent frustration of
compensation for personal injuries. 56
Strict tort liability of manufacturers for injury-causing defective products
is supported by the policy of assuring human safety. 57 In addition, the cor-
50. Dippel v. Scano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
51. See notes 119-26 infra and accompanying text.
52. Oregon Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. E.L. Caldwell & Sons, 306 F. Supp. 835 (D. Ore.
1969); Maas v. Dreker, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1969); People ex rel. General Motors
Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super.
299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972).
53. Luque v. McLeon, 8 Cal. 2d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972). The de-
velopment of strict liability was described by Dean Prosser in two significant articles: Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as The Fall]; Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con.
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as The Assault]. See also Gillam, Products
Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958).
54. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972); Hornung
v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970); Grinnell v. C. Pfizer & Co.,
274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d
403, 79 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1969); see Kesser, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 902 (1967);
Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Post Vandermark, 38
S. CAL. L. REv. 30, 46 (1965).
55. See, e.g., Wittkamp v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Kerr v.
Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
56. The argument was expressed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey: "[P]ractical ad-
ministration suggests that the principle of liability be expressed in terms of strict liability in tort
thus enabling it to be applied in practice unconfined by the narrow conceptualism associated
with the technical niceties of sales and warranties." Newark v. Gimbels, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 595,
258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at
655-56 (4th ed. 1971).
57. Another public policy purpose which strict liability is thought to fulfill is the deterence
of the sale and manufacture of defective products. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
However, Dean Prosser argued that strict liability is not necessary:
One may well ask at the outset, why is not liability for negligence enough? Why
do the plaintiffs want strict liability; and have they any valid claim to it?
Where the action is against the manufacturer of the product, an honest estimate
might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability
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porate producer is often in the best position to absorb and redistribute the
cost of safety. 58 Economic loss, however, is rarely so debilitating or so
overwhelming as physical impairment. 5 9 Thus, the same public purpose is
not served by holding manufacturers strictly liable for economic loss. Fur-
thermore, there is little policy reason for redistributing the risk of one con-
sumer's unfulfilled expectations among other consumers. 60 Consequently,
the policy considerations which support strict tort liability for personal injury
and property loss do not warrant its expansion to direct economic loss.
Nonetheless, a consumer who is deprived of his bargain should be com-
pensated, and often the manufacturer is the only solvent party with enough
"fault" in the transaction. A consideration of the two major theories of re-
covery and the impact of the Iacono decision on these theories will provide
insight into how a well-defined theory of enterprise liability should handle
direct economic loss.
would result in recovery where negligence does not. When a negligence action is
brought against a manufacturer, the plaintiff is faced with two initial tasks. One is to
prove that his injury has been caused by a defect in the product. The other is to
prove that the defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant. For
neither of these is strict liability of any aid to him whatever. It cannot prove causa-
tion; and it cannot trace that cause to the defendant. Once over these two hurdles,
the plaintiff has a third task, to prove that the defect was there because of the
defendant's negligence. This is by far the easiest of the three, and it is one in which
the plaintiff almost never fails.
It is true that he has the burden of proof on the issue of negligence. It is true
also that he seldom, if ever, has any direct evidence of what went on in the defend-
ant's plant. But in every jurisdiction, he is aided by the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, or by its practical equivalent. In all jurisdictions this at least gives rise to a
permissible inference of the defendant's negligence, which gets the plaintiff to the
jury. And in cases against manufacturers, once the cause of the harm is laid at their
doorstep, a jury verdict for the defendant on the negligence issue is virtually un-
known.
The Assault, supra note 53, at 1114. But see Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely
Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv.
145 (1972).
58. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944). See
also Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REv. 363, 366 (1965).
However, this assumption has been criticized; see Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to
Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract? 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539
n.6 (1966).
59. But see Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 24 (1965) (dissenting opinion). Judge Peters argues in his dissent that economic loss is as
overwhelming as physical debilitation.
60. See Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 939-40, quoting Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965):
[Pllacing the burden of physical injury on the manufacturer who can distribute it
among the consuming public, rather than upon the individual to whom it may be an
"overwhelming misfortune," in no way "justifies requiring the consuming public to
pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility
that sorre of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his cus-
tomers."
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II. TBE GENESIS OF STIcr TORT LIABILITY
FOR EcONoMrc LOSS
A manufacturer's liability for product-caused personal injury to the prod-
uct's consumer was traditionally based upon either of two theories: (1) the
negligence of the manufacturer, or (2) a breach of a sales warranty in the
contract between the parties. 61 Strict liability in tort for personal injury,
without negligence and without privity, eventually developed as a means of
avoiding the obstacles which frustrated recovery for personal injuries under
warranty and negligence theories.
Historically, the distinction between the two theories was based upon
privity of contract. If the parties were in privity, an action for breach of
warranty could be maintained; if privity were not present, an action in tort
for negligent manufacture was appropriate. The two theories served different
functions. Negligence actions afforded recovery for direct physical injury to a
person or his property which resulted from a latent defect in the prod-
uct. 62 Consequential damages, such as direct and indirect economic loss,
were not of "the character of harm contemplated by the rule which [ren-
dered] a manufacturer liable in negligence." 63 Breach of warranty theory,
on the other hand, afforded recovery for damage to the product purchased
and for economic loss without the necessity of proving fault."
There were, however, serious obstacles which precluded recovery for
physical injuries caused by defective products under the negligence and
breach of warranty theories. Since breach of warranty was based upon con-
tract, recovery for personal injury might be precluded if the plaintiff was not
in privity with the defendant, if the plaintiff had not relied upon the war-
ranty, if the plaintiff had not complied with notice requirements, or if the
defendant had expressly disclaimed liability for such injuries or damages as
those for which the plaintiff was seeking recovery.65 Comparable obstacles
faced the plaintiff in a negligence action. The plaintiff had to show that the
particular defendant was responsible for the defect, that proper inspection
by the defendant would have revealed the defect, and that a specific negli-
gent act or omission caused the defect. 66
Strict tort liability theory developed as a more workable alternative to
these two theories. Of great impact upon its formation was an increasingly
unfavorable view toward privity in negligence actions. The development of
the tort theory of breach of implied warranty for personal injury caused by
61. 63 AM. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 2 (1972).
62. See text accompanying notes 67-79 infra.
63. W. PRossEB, supra note 56, at 665.
64. 63 AM. JuR. 2d Products Liability § 25 (1972).
65. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1960).
66. id.
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food products, without privity and without negligence, served as the basis
from which strict liability grew. Subsequent inclusion of products other than
food and damages for economic loss, as well as personal injury within the
strict liability framework, has also been based upon the implied warranty in
tort action.
A. The Debilitation of Privity
Products liability suits based upon the manufacturer's faulty design or
construction were typically negligence actions. Such suits were usually ini-
tiated by a plaintiff seeking compensation for personal injury or damage to
property from an accident allegedly caused by the defective product.6 7 The
requirement of privity of contract in negligence actions against manufactur-
ers derived from the holding of Winterbottom v. Wright.68 However, in
1842, when Winterbottom was decided, industrialization was in its infancy.
Consumers generally purchased goods directly from the local manufacturer.
Since that time, technological change and economies of scale have effected
substantial increases in profit margins. Greater pay to a larger work force 69
and current distribution methods have vastly expanded the concept of a
market by making goods more available. 70 Within the specialized economic
system which developed, middlemen frequently intervene between the
producer and the ultimate consumer. 71 Limiting recovery to those in con-
tractual privity with the manufacturer has become inadequate and unjust.7 2
For example, a manufactured product purchased at retail may cause
67. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Mickle v.
Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
68. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In Winterbottom, the plaintiff was an employee of a mail
carrier, who had contracted with the Postmaster General to convey the mail. The Postmaster
General had also contracted with the defendant to provide and maintain the mail coaches. Thus,
there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff was
injured when he was thrown to the ground after the coach he was driving broke down.
69. P. SAMJELSON, ECONOMICS 28 (9th ed. 1973).
70. Transportation of goods by rail, air, and the interstate highway system has expanded the
area a seller can reach with his products.
71. Few manufacturers deal directly with consumers. The most obvious example is the au-
tomobile industry where the consumer purchases a car from the retailer, not from the manufac-
turer in Detroit.
72. The doctrine of privity of contract, insofar as that doctrine immunizes a manufacturer or
a remote seller from negligence liability for product-caused injuries, is no longer the law in
Ohio. In 1935, the Ohio Supreme Court in Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St.
43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935), extended the protection afforded by negligence per se to persons
proximately injured by defective food products who were not in privity with the producer. Id.
at 46, 196 N.E. at 635. By imposing liability without proof of negligent preparation, even where
the injured plaintiff and the defendant-producer were not in privity, the decision in Canton
Provision Co. had the effect of imposing strict liability for personal injuries upon the producers
of defective foods.
Sixteen years later an Ohio common pleas court in DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co.,
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harm to a member of the retail purchaser's family. Similarly, if a product is
lost or conveyed as a gift, product-caused injury may be sustained by one
whose identity is, prior to the accident, completely unknown to the man-
ufacturer or the retailer. Thus, exceptions to the general requirement of
privity in negligence actions are necessary to protect the general public in
an industrialized economy. 73
Presently, the general rule in Ohio is that a manufacturer will be held
liable for his negligence where the defect causes injury to persons74 or to
46 Ohio Op. 161, 163, 102 N.E.2d 289, 292 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1951), noted that privity,
as a "general rule" of law, had been significantly debilitated by "numerous and ... important"
exceptions. Nevertheless, privity, with the noted exceptions, continued to be a doctrine of law
in Ohio until 1966, when the court in Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967), rejected privity as an element of a negligence action
against a remote manufacturer.
73. The first exception to the privity rule was the "inherently dangerous product" rule. In
1852, the New York Court of Appeals in Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), dispensed
with the privity requirement where a manufacturer was shown to have been guilty of negli-
gence in connection with an injury-causing product which was dangerous by nature. Thereafter,
the Thomas rationale was adopted in Ohio in Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350
(1887), and applied to a variety of products in personal injury actions including hair dye, Sicard
v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938), an electric blanket, Wood v. General Elec.
Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953), rev'd in part sub nom. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966), a sewing machine, White Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927), a grinding wheel, DiVello v. Gardner Mach.
Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1951), and a portable grain
elevator, Mobberly v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 126, 211 N.E.2d 839 (1965).
Besides encompassing a variety of products, the theory was extended to cover damage to prop-
erty. Another Ohio decision noted that the "inherently dangerous product" exception to the
rule of privity may be applicable to cases involving product-caused injury to the purchaser's
property. Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949).
The second major exception to the privity of contract rule in a negligence action was
announced by the then Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916). Speaking for the New York Court of Appeals in 1916, Judge Cardozo ex-
panded the inherently dangerous product exception to include products which were not
dangerous by nature, but were dangerous if defectively made; such products were termed "im-
minently dangerous."
Ohio has adopted the imminently dangerous product exception. The Mobberly and
DiVello decisions indicate that a product which is not dangerous by its nature is within the
imminently dangerous exception if it contains a defect which renders it dangerous when applied
to its intended use.
A third exception developed in the area of food sales. At first, the contractual notion
of privity determined the class of persons protected by a food producer's duty of care. The
Assault, supra note 53, at 1103-10. However, later statutory provisions prohibiting the sale of
impure food in Ohio, violation of which proved negligence as a matter of law (negligence per se),
provided the basis from which this exception to the doctrine of privity developed in Ohio. For
examples of this development, see Wolfe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643,
56 N.E.2d 230 (1944) (extended the strict statutory liability to a retailer of food); Clark Restaur-
ant Co. v. Simmons, 29 Ohio App. 220, 163 N.E. 210 (1927) (a restaurant serving food is within
the meaning of the statutes barring the sale of unwholesome food).
74. Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942
(1967); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
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the purchaser's property. 75 The courts, however, have shown considerable
reluctance to dispense with the requirement of privity where the negligence
action is for damage to the item sold, such as a suit in negligence for the
cost of repairing latent defects in the product. In 1965, the Ohio Supreme
Court in Inglis v. American Motors Corp.76 refused to expand negligence
liability to protect against purely economic loss where there was no privity
of contract. The plaintiff in Inglis claimed that the manufacturer had negli-
gently inspected an automobile before it was delivered.7 7 After purchasing
the automobile from the retail dealer, the plaintiff discovered that its true
value was less than one-half of the purchase price. 78 The court indicated
that damages for inferior quality should be left to breach-of-warranty actions
(where privity is a requirement), because such damages depend on the
terms of the arms-length bargain. 79 However, the court overcame the priv-
iiy requirement by allowing recovery upon breach of the express warranty,
made to the plaintiff by general advertising through mass communications
media, that the automobile was trouble-free, economical, and manufactured
to high standards. 80
In addition to using a manufacturer's advertisements to create an express
warranty to the consumer, a number of other devices have been employed
to hold remote manufacturers liable without privity: (1) a warranty runs with
the product; (2) a retailer is the manufacturer's or the consumer's agent; (3) a
retailer's cause of action is assigned to the consumer; (4) the consumer is a
third-party beneficiary of the manufacturer's contract with the dealer; and (5)
notice requirements and disclaimers are inapplicable to products liability ac-
tions for breach of implied warranty.81 In effect, these contrivances have
held manufacturers liable despite the presence in the contract of limited
warranties or clauses limiting remedies and liability.
75. Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949).
76. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
77. The failure to properly inspect has been more successfully utilized in personal injury
cases. In Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443. (1972), the court
held that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
78. 3 Ohio St. 2d at 134, 209 N.E.2d at 584.
79. See notes 169-78 infra and accompanying text.
80. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 136, 209 N.E.2d 583, 585 (1965).
81. Compensation for personal injuries has also been recovered pursuant to a variety of
fictions. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). See also Gillam, Products
Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 152-55 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS
§ 402A, comment b at 349 (1965).
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B. Implied Warranty
Strict tort liability, as expressed in section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, is the offspring of the implied warranty in tort.8 2 Recovery
under the law of warranty for personal injury caused by a remote manufac-
turer's defective product originated in food cases.8 3 In 1927, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi developed the theory of an implied warranty running
with the product to avoid the doctrine of privity.84 Eventually the notion of
a warranty running with the goods was dropped, and courts found an im-
plied warranty directly from the remote manufacturer to the consumer.8 5
Because the implied warranty was imposed regardless of privity, it was con-
strued to be a tort rather than a contract cause of action. Dean Prosser
described the implied warranty in tort as follows:
[I]t has been said over and over again that this warranty-if that is
the name for it-is not the old sales warranty, it is not the war-
ranty covered by the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. It is not a warranty of the seller to the buyer at all, but
it is something separate and distinct which sounds in tort exclu-
sively, and not at all in contract; which exists apart from any con-
tract between the parties .... 86
Deciding counter to this general theory, the Ohio Supreme Court in
1935 declared that an implied warranty cause of action sounded in contract,
not in tort. The court's decision in Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder8 7 had
the effect of imposing strict liability upon remote manufacturers by extend-
ing the legislative protection of negligence per se to injured people who
were not in contractual privity with the food producer; the Ohio legislature
had accomplished what was, in effect, strict liability without relying on an
implied tort warranty. Nonetheless, the action in tort for breach of implied
warranty was accepted in Ohio in 1951.88 By allowing an injured plaintiff to
join a breach of warranty action and a negligence action against a remote
manufacturer, liability without negligence and without privity for personal
injuries caused by food products was established. Dean Prosser reported
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment b at 349 (1965).
83. See generally The Fall, supra note 53.
84. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927). This theory is
analogous to that of the title of real property running with the land.
85. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958); The Fall, supra note
53, at 800-05.
86. Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General, 36 J. CLEv. B. AssN 149,
167-68 (1965).
87. 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
88. Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 46 Ohio Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1951).
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that by 1962 this "new kind of warranty" had been imposed in tort in most
jurisdictions.8 9
Liability without negligence and without privity was expanded beyond
food to include personal injuries caused by other products in 1960, when the
New Jersey Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 90 The courts of Ohio bad already allowed recovery
for personal injury from such articles as soap 91 and a hair permanent solu-
tion. 92 Thus by 1960, Ohio had expanded the implied warranty in tort to
what was essentially strict liability for internal personal injuries to remote
producers of articles intended for bodily uses which were external as well as
internal.
C. Strict Liability for Product-Caused Injury
Strict liability in tort developed separately from the implied warranty
theory, although they have converged in modern tort theory. The genesis of
strict liability in tort for personal injury demonstrates the influence individ-
uals may exert on developing legal principles. Justice Traynor's concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.93 was the first suggestion that
liability for injuries or damages allegedly caused by a product could be re-
coverable under strict liability in tort. Dean Prosser, a close associate of
Justice Traynor, adopted the strict liability theory in section 84 of his
treatise on torts. 94 Prosser's argument that strict tort liability would more
adequately compensate for personal injury and property damage than the
"intricacies of sales law" appears in both of his classic law review arti-
cles. 95 Strict liability in tort for personal injury from defective products was
subsequently adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for which
Dean Prosser was the chief reporter and Chief Justice Traynor a con-
tributor. 96 Although section 402A purported to be a restatement of the law,
it was reported before most jurisdictions had adopted strict tort liability.97
89. The Fall, supra note 53, at 801.
90. 82 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
91. See Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E. 2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953), ret'd on
other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
92. See Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181
(1958).
93. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
94. W. PsossER, supra note 56, at 510.
95. The Fall, supra note 53; The Assault, supra note 53.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965). See generally Dickerson, Was Pros-
ser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should the Judge's Monument Be Moved to a Firmer Site? 2
HOFSTRA L. REv. 469 (1974).
97. See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17
W. REs. L. REv. 5, 7 n.6 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Strict Tort Theory].
[Vol. 27:683
ECONOMIC LOSS RECOVERY
Under section 402A, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proving
specific acts of negligence. The plaintiff-purchaser is also protected from the
defense of notice, disclaimer, and lack of privity. Strict liability, however, is
not absolute liability. The plaintiff who invokes section 402A must prove that
there was in fact an injury, the defect which made the product unreasonably
dangerous proximately caused the injury, and the product became defective
when it was in the control of the manufacturer.98 Negligent manufacture is
not an element of section 402A strict liability; the determination is whether
the manufacturer had control over the defective product when it became
defective. 99
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts implied a resolution to
the question of whether a manufacturer's liability for defective products
properly sounded in contract or tort. Prior to the Escola decision and the
advent of section 402A, strict liability had generally been limited to injuries
caused by dangerous animals' 00 and ultralazardous activities.' 0' It was ar-
gued that because neither privity nor negligence were elements of the im-
plied warranty tort, strict liability for personal injuries would have the same
effect as a tort action for breach of implied warranty.' 0 2 Furthermore, the
problem which prompted Chief Justice Traynor and Dean Prosser to suggest
the strict liability terminology-the confusion created by burdening noncon-
tracting parties with the contractual limitations suggested by the term "war-
ranty"' 0 3 -would be avoided by strict tort liability.
Although the UCC presently controls the law of contractual warranty in
forty-nine states, 10 4 strict liability and the UCC appeared nearly simulta-
neously; Ohio adopted the UCC in 1962 105 and the strict liability theory
suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Torts was embraced in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 10 in 1963. Consequently, the flexibility of the
98. See, e.g., Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969); Walton
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969). Another element that the plaintiff
must prove is that the product was unreasonably dangerous in its defective condition.
99. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 II!. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968), revod on other
grounds, 45 II. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299,
296 A.2d 668 (Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392
(1974).
100. See Crunk v. Clover, 167 Neb. 816, 95 N.W.2d 135 (1959).
101. See Forster v. Rogers, 247 Pa. 54, 93 A. 26 (1915). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
519, 520 (1938).
102. The Fall, supra note 53, at 802-03.
103. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Class Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
104. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 1 (1972).
105. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1301.01 through 1309.50 (Page 1962).
106. In 1963, the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), became the first to expressly hold that a
claimant may recover in a nonprivity personal injury case under strict tort liability. In Green-
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Code provisions was not widely known when strict liability was adopted. It
has been suggested that although the UCC could have handled liability for
product-caused personal injuries, contract theory was precluded because of
the identification of sales warranty law with the rigid standards of the Uni-
form Sales Act. 10 7
Since the Greenman decision, courts throughout the country have come
to recognize that there is no substantive difference between an action in tort
for breach of an implied warranty and strict liability for personal in-
jury. 108 Thus, a remote manufacturer's strict liability for personal injuries
has been established. 10 9
There are two persuasive arguments for the adoption of strict tort liabil-
ity over contractual liability for product-caused personal injuries. First, the
policies of tort law are better served by strict liability than by the implied
warranty theory. Second, the UCC does not adequately compensate for per-
sonal injuries caused by defective products."10
1. Public Policies Justify Strict Liability for Product-Caused Injuries
The public interest in human life demands the maximum protection the
law can provide from dangerously defective products. Consumers are often
helpless to protect themselves from sophisticated, but defective, equip-
man, the plaintiff, who was injured by a power tool purchased by his wife, brought an action
against the remote manufacturer. As one of the causes of action was based on breach of war-
ranty, the manufacturer argued that recovery should be denied, since the plaintiff had failed to
comply with the notice provisions of the sales law. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
699. The California Supreme Court, however, found that the plaintiff was not required to give
notice since he was not a party to the contract. Id. at 61-62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
700. More importantly, the court held that the manufacturer was not only liable for breach of
express warranty, but that he was also liable under strict tort liability. In upholding the strict
liability theory, Chief Justice Traynor relied upon the policy of risk distribution: the public
interest in human safety requires maximum protection and manufacturers are best able to dis-
tribute its cost by price adjustments. Id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
In addition, the implied tort warranty cause of action, which has been equated with strict
liability, had been accepted in Ohio by 1958. See Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106
Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
107. Strict Tort Theory, supra note 97, at 20-21.
108. See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972);
Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970); McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Sup. 1967). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A, comment f at 351 (1965).
109. See Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability:
An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 145, 150 n.23 (1972); Noel, Defective
Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv.
93, 93-94 n.4 (1972).
110. The adoption of strict tort liability over contractual liability may also be justified, to
some extent, from a historical perspective. Warranty actions traditionally arose out of tort, not
contract, as noted by the Ohio Supreme Court:
A prevalent but mistaken notion is that the term "warranty" has always carried the
[Vol. 27:683
ECONOMIC LOSS RECOVERY
ment. 1 ' Moreover, the modern retailer is no more than the conduit
through whom products reach their ultimate user. The consumer receives
little protection from his immediate seller, the retailer,1 12 because even if
the retailer is subject to strict liability, the purchaser must prove the defect
arose when the product was in -the hands of the defendant. Therefore, hold-
ing a manufacturer liable without privity and without negligence may be
necessary if the manufacturer is the only person against whom the plaintiff
can maintain that difficult burden of proof.
Numerous other policies may also be advanced in support of strict liabil-
ity: strict liability provides greater protection to the consumer than does
contractual liability; a manufacturer can distribute the risk of personal injury
by purchasing insurance; "13 the manufacturer who placed the product into
commerce should be responsible for the consequences;"14 the deterrent ef-
fect of strict liability will result in increased care in the production proc-
ess; "15 proceeding directly against a remote manufacturer is less wasteful of
judicial effort than pursuing a manufacturer with a series of actions."i 6 For
these reasons, strict liability has been adopted to prevent the absence of
implication of a contractual relationship. From a historical standpoint such a notion
is without foundation. Some of the cases, and well-known and respected writers on
legal subjects point out that originally the consumer or user of an article, which was
represented to be in good condition and fit for use, and proved not to be, was
accorded redress by an expansion of the action of trespass on the case to include
deceit-a fraudulent misrepresentation-which sounds distinctly in tort. Undoubt-
edly, the recognition of such a right of action rested on the public policy of protect-
ing an innocent buyer from harm rather than to insure any contractual rights.
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 247, 147 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1958). See
generally Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American Products
Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 647 (1977).
111. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (the court
noted that the average purchaser lacks the expertise to do any more than rely upon advertising
claims in selecting a purchase).
112. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
113. The insurance premiums may be viewed as a legitimate cost of doing business.
114. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function, and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974). The author suggests a
representation theory of products liability. The introduction of a product into the market is a
representation by the manufacturer and seller that the product is reasonably safe and adequate
for the uses for which it was designed. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 97, at 651 (4th ed. 1971); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability,
24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 1012-13 (1957).
115. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(194).
116. A multi-action suit involves suing the immediate retailer first, who would then seek
indemnification from his seller, and so on up the chain until ultimately suit is brought against
the original manufacturer. See Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 926. As exam-
ples of this "expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful process," Dean Prosser cites Shefiman v.
Balfour Housing Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 468, 234 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. 1962), and Tri-City Fur
Foods v. Ammerman, 7 Wis. 2d 149, 96 N.W.2d 495 (1959). W. PROSSER, supra note 114, § 97
at 651.
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privity, or proof of negligent production, from shielding manufacturers from
liability for defective products that cause personal injury. 117
2. Compensation for Personal Injuries under the UCC
Article 2 of the UCC is designed to assure the mutual satisfaction of the
parties to a commercial contract. However, those who favor strict tort liabil-
ity argue that that purpose does not effectively protect injured individuals
because "several limitations imposed by the Code . . .are arbitrary when
applied to products liability actions." ' 1 8 These limitations are the require-
ment of notice and contractual privity. 119
A purchaser who has accepted goods "must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach [of contract] notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy." 120 The notice provision
was designed to debilitate the common law rule that acceptance of a good
constitutes a waiver of any right to recover on a warranty. 121 In a commer-
cial sale, the notice requirement affords the seller an opportunity to remedy
117. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
118. Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 925.
It has been argued that the Code provisions should be applied to sophisticated parties or
large corporations, but that they should not be interposed between parties of unequal bargain-
ing power. See Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d
150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
119. See generally Strict Tort Theory, supra note 97, at 23-39; Comment, The Vexing Prob-
lem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4
SETON HALL L. REV. 145, 167-80 (1972); Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at
958-64.
Previously, disclaimers had also been used to escape liability for personal injury. Because
private parties cannot be said to have bargained equally, the UCC makes disclaimers of liability
for personal injury prima facie unconscionable. However, the Code does permit a manufacturer
broad freedom to disclaim or limit liability for economic loss. Section 2-719 reads:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the
preceeding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution
for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of dam-
ages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to
return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of
non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essen-
tial purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
120. U.C.C. § 2-607.
121. Strict Tort Theory, supra note 97, at 28.
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the defect or to replace the product; it also protects him from stale claims.
Yet when a defective product causes personal injury, repair and replacement
are not viable remedies. Furthermore, the comparatively short statute of
limitations in tort for personal injury lessens the danger of de-
layed claims.' 2 2 Thus, notice is not properly applicable to personal injury
actions and failure to notify should not bar compensation.1
2 3
In the modem marketplace the buyer of a product deals directly with a
retailer, or a similar intermediary dealership. Under the Uniform Sales Act,
the requirement of contractual privity in a products liability action pre-
vented purchasers from being compensated by the remote manufacturer for
product-caused injuries. Section 2-318 of the UCC, as adopted by the Ohio
General Assembly,12 4 dispenses with the requirement of privity where
natural persons who are family members or guests of the purchaser have
been injured.125 This narrow rejection of privity would, however, frustrate
the policy of preventing overwhelming financial and physical impairment to
those who are outside the class of people protected from personal injury by
section 2-318.126 Consequently, Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A, which speaks in terms of protecting ultimate users as well as pur-
chasers, is the preferred position for recovery of personal injury.
Some courts, moreover, have expanded both the class of persons pro-
tected by strict liability and the class of manufacturers who can be held
strictly liable. Foreseeable users of a defective product may successfully
maintain an action against a remote manufacturer for personal injuries.' 2 7
A number of cases have expanded the protection expressed in section 402A
to injured individuals who are not users of the product, including by-
standers.' 28 Retailers, as well as manufacturers, have been held strictly
122. The tort statute of limitations in Ohio is two years; OHIO REV. CODE.ANN. § 2305.10
(Page 1954). The UCC statute of limitations is four years; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.98
(Page 1962).
123. See Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965).
124. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1962).
125. UCC section 2-318, as adopted in Ohio, reads:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
126. Furthermore, UCC section 1-103 states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud . . . or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions.
Therefore, privity of contract is not totally removed from the sales law. Section 2-318 repre-
sents the only exception to the otherwise intact doctrine.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A, comment 1 at 354-55 (1965).
128. See, e.g., Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Codling v.
Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). But see Mull v. Ford Motor
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liable for personal injuries. 129 Apart from the class of persons coming
within the ambit of strict liability, the nature of recovery has expanded as
well. The most recent expansion of strict liability has occurred where the
damage claimed is economic loss, rather than personal injury.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FOR RECOVERY OF ECONOMIc LOSS
It has been shown that compensation of personal injuries caused by a
defective product has been recovered from remote manufacturers under four
theories: negligence, 130 strict liability, 13 1 express warranty, 1 32 and implied
warranty. 133 However, only the last three of these theories may also be
applied where the only measure of damage is direct economic loss.13
A. Recovery of Direct Economic Loss under
Strict Liability
In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. '135 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey extended section 402A strict tort liability beyond personal injury ac-
tions by allowing the purchaser of a defective carpet to recover for direct
economic loss from a remote manufacturer.' 36 The plaintiff-purchaser in
Santor had been induced by the defendant-manufacturer's advertisements to
purchase the defendant's carpet from an intermediate retailer.' 3 7 Defects in
the carpeting caused unusual lines of wear to develop, a condition which
became more apparent with use and considerably lessened the aesthetic
value of the product. After eight months the plaintiff attempted to return
Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystan-
der: A Study in Common Law Determninism, 38 U. Cm. L REv. 625 (1971); 19 N.Y.LF. 883
(1974).
129. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964). See generally Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Products Liability
Law, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 528 (1971).
Section 402A has not been expanded to hold a doctor strictly liable. See Magrine v.
Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100
N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 <1969).
130. See notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text.
131. See text accompanying notes 93-129 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 61--65 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 82-88 supra.
134. See note 4 supra and text accompanying notes' 39-41 supra.
135. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 56, 207 A.2d at 307. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not rely on
thq advertisement in its holding, id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-13, as the Ohio Supreme Court did
in Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). See text accom-
panying note 170 infra.
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the carpeting to the retailer, but that dealer had discontinued his New Jer-
sey business and had moved out of the state.1 38 Consequently, the pur-
chaser initiated a cause of action against the remote manufacturer for breach
of implied warranty to recover the purchase price of the carpet.1 3 9
The trial court awarded the plaintiff recovery from the manufacturer for
loss of the value of the carpet on the basis of a breach of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability.' 40 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however,
held the manufacturer strictly liable in tort for the loss of the bargain.1 41
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus rejected the conclusion of the ap-
pellate division that recovery on the implied tort warranty of a remote man-
ufacturer was limited by the rule of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.' 42 to defective products which were "dangerous to life or limb."' 4 3 In-
stead, the court found that the presence of the product on the market consti-
tuted a representation by the manufacturer that the product was suitable for its
intended use. The Santor decision thus represented another judicial inroad on
the doctrine of privity beyond accident-caused personal and property damage to
actions for breach of implied warranty in tort where the defect had caused
direct economic loss. Although recovery was structured under an implied war-
ranty theory, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that awarding direct
economic loss for breach of an implied tort warranty, without privity and with-
out proof of negligent manufacture, was essentially strict tort liability for
economic loss.144 The court in effect held that a remote purchaser could re-
cover direct economic loss under strict tort theory.'4
B. Recovery of Direct Economic Loss under an
Express Warranty Theory
When an express warranty has been breached, direct economic loss has
consistently been recoverable.' 46 Recovery of economic loss for breach of an
138. 44 N.J. 52, 56, 207 A.2d 305, 307 (1965).
139. Id. at 57, 207 A.2d at 307.
140. Id.
141. The court defined the loss of the bargain damages as the "difference between the price
paid by plaintiff and the actual market value of the defective carpeting at the time when plaintiff
knew or should have known that it was defective." Id. at 68-69, 207 A.2d at 314.
142. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
143. 82 N.J. Super. 319, 197 A.2d 589 (1964).
144. 44 N.J. 52, 63-66, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1965).
145. Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312. By allowing direct economic loss recovery under a strict tort
liability theory, the Santor decision has expanded the strict tort concept beyond the limits
recognized in section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts. Strict liability under section 402A
only applies to cases of physical injury or property damage, not to direct economic loss.
146. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on rehearing, 168
Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932). See generally The Fall, supra note 53, at 834-38.
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express warranty entails holding a manufacturer to his representations. 14 7
The difficulty of defining the term "defective" 14 8 is avoided if an express
warranty is made because the manufacturer's representation becomes the
standard against which the product he actually delivers is judged. Since the
standard of care is strictly limited by the agreement, decisions awarding
recovery of economic loss on an express warranty do not expand a manufac-
turer's duty by imposing a general duty to prevent all defects which would
cause economic loss on the bargain. Therefore, the troublesome economic
and social ramifications of holding a manufacturer strictly liable do not arise
if an express contractual warranty, as opposed to an Inglis-type express ad-
vertisement, can be asserted. In addition, the class of persons to whom the
manufacturer is liable is not subject to expansion as it has been Imder strict
liability because the class of people protected by the warranty is generally
limited by the sales agreement.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor
Co. 149 provides a thoughtful consideration of whether economic loss damage
should be recoverable under the warranty provisions of the UCC, or
whether strict liability is more appropriate. In Seely the plaintiff purchased a
truck which had been manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff and
defendant were not in privity; the purchaser had entered into a sales con-
tract with an intermediate retailer.1 50 After eleven months of unsuccessful
attempts by the defendant to correct a bounce in the front end of the truck,
the plaintiff stopped making payments and the truck was subsequently re-
possessed. 51 The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for breach of an express
warranty in the purchase agreement that the truck was "free from defects in
material and workmanship under normal use and service." 152 The recovery
sought by the plaintiff included the amount of the purchase price which had
been paid to the dealer, or direct economic loss as measured by "out of
pocket" expense, and the loss of profits which occurred because the plaintiff
was unable to use the truck in his hauling business, or indirect economic
loss. 153 The plaintiff also sought to recover under a strict tort theory for
147. See generally Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 930-35.
148. See generally Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339
(1974); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41
TEx. L. REv. 855 (1963); Comment, Products Liability-A Product Need Not Be "Unreasonably
Dangerous" For Plaintiff to Recover Under Section 402 A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 6
RuTr.-CAM. L.J. 189 (1974).
149. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
150. Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The express warranty upon which the
plaintiff recovered overcame any problems of privity. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr.
at 20.
151. Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
152. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
153. Id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
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damage to the truck resulting from an accident allegedly caused by the de-
fect.15 4
The California Supreme Court's decision permitted recovery of the pay-
ments on the purchase price as well as the loss of profits because of the
breach of the express warranty1 55 However, recovery was disallowed for
the damage to the truck because the cause of the accident was not suffi-
ciently proven. 1 56
Significantly, Chief Justice Traynor, an originator and proponent of the
strict tort cause of action and the author of the earlier Greenman opinion
adopting the concept of strict liability for personal injury, 157 wrote the Seely
decision. In Seely, Justice Traynor stated that holding a manufacturer
strictly liable for economic losses, such as the lost profits in Seely, would
expose him to damages of "unknown and unlimited scope."' 5 8 Because of
the difficulty of defining a standard of quality to which the manufacturer
should be held strictly liable, UCC warranty representations would provide
the most workable measure of enterprise liability for economic loss.' 5 9
Furthermore, the court held that strict tort is not available for recovery of
economic loss in California.
Justice Traynor stated that the policy of risk distribution ' 60 does not
support holding a remote manufacturer strictly liable for economic losses.
Because economic loss is not as debilitating as physical impairment, Justice
Traynor concluded that the cost of insuring against pecuniary damage should
not be passed on to the consumers in the form of higher prices. 161 Fur-
thermore, economic loss arises in a commercial setting, and warranty law
was originally and specially developed to meet the "needs of commercial
transactions." ' 62 The decision concludes, therefore, that economic loss such
as loss of profits or loss on the bargain is properly governed by the UCC-
the embodiment of legislative thinking on commercial transactions--rather
than by strict liability theory in tort.
C. Recovery of Direct Economic Loss in
Tort for Breach of an Implied Warranty
Compensation for economic loss has not been readily awarded in tort
154. Id.
155. Id. at 14, 403 P.2d at 148-49, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
156. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
157. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
158. 63 Cal. 2d at 17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
159. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
160. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
161. Id. at 18-19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. However, Justice Peters, in his
concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that economic damage is as debilitating as physical
injury. Id. at 24-25, 403 P.2d at 155, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
162. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.,
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if the warranty must be inferred. 163 The few courts that have permitted
recovery of economic loss for breach of an implied warranty have relied
upon the fact that the defective product threatened personal injury or dam-
age to the purchaser's other property as well as economic loss. This distinc-
tion arose because recovery in tort had traditionally been limited to actual
physical damage to persons or property. The decision of the Ohio court in
Iacono appears to have placed Ohio among the small minority of jurisdic-
tions that have allowed recovery of economic loss in tort for breach of an
implied warranty regardless of whether the defective product caused, or
even threatened to cause, personal injury or damage to other property. 164
The Ohio Supreme Court had previously recognized that the breach of
an implied warranty is a tort. In Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,165
the court reasoned that it was a mistake to construe a warranty only accord-
ing to contractual limitations because, historically, an action for breach of
warranty was in tort. 166 Since that decision, courts throughout the country
have held that strict tort liability is synonomous with a tort action for breach
of implied warranty, 16 7 but most of these decisions entail personal injury or
property damage. Although the implied tort warranty has been construed as
substantively identical to strict liability in personal injury actions, the policy
purposes of strict liability do not support its extension to direct economic
loss. The UCC warranty provisions were designed to control commercial
transactions such as the one in Iacono. Because of the court's imprecise
treatment of the damage issue, either strict liability or the UCC may define
the Iacono tort for "breach of implied warranty." It is necessary to consider
the cases relied upon by the Ohio Supreme Court, as well as later decisions,
to determine the actual substantive limitations of the Iacono tort.
163. See notes 82-92 supra and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1973);
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873
(1958); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); Lang
v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). But see Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d
781 (5th Cir. 1973); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25
(S.D. Iowa 1973); Noel Transfer & Package Delivery Serv., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 341
F. Supp. 968 (D. Minn. 1972); Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501 (D.
Colo. 1969); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973); Lewis v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570, 97 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1972); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v.
Continental Can Co., 72 11. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472
S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
165. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
166. Id. at 247-48, 147 N.E.2d at 614-15.
167. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963); cases cited in note 108
supra. See also cases cited in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377
P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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IV. THE OHIO PmvrWTY/NONPrxvTY
APPROACH TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY SUITS
The tortIUCC dichotomy is based upon the presence or absence of priv-
ity in Ohio, while other states have relegated the question of privity to a
secondary role. Under the New Jersey approach, the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity controls products liability suits for personal injury as well as economic
loss; privity is not considered. Other states follow the California courts, by
applying the UCC and its expansion of privity under section 2-318. How-
ever, in Ohio if privity is present, the court applies the UCC. Although the
court would turn to a tort theory of recovery if there were no privity, the
content of the tort warranty is derived from the UCC. As a result the Ohio
cause of action for economic loss-implied warranty theory-represents a
hybrid of the two major theories that have afforded recovery in other juris-
dictions.
A products liability suit involving economic loss may be used to illustrate
the three theories. Assume a consumer purchases an automobile from a re-
tail dealership without any representations having been made by the man-
ufacturer. The valves in the automobile engine soon prove defective causing
poor performance and considerable oil loss. The consumer then sues the
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty in tort which he claims arose
because the mere presence of the auto in the public market indicates it
would suitably provide transportation.
In this hypothetical situation, those jurisdictions following the New
Jersey/Santor approach would permit recovery. The court would accept the
implied tort warranty and, assuming the defect arose when the engine was
in the hands of the remote manufacturer and the purchaser can prove the
economic loss was caused by the defect, hold the remote manufacturer
strictly liable.
A state following the California/Seely theory would apply the UCC. Since
there were no express contractual warranties made to the consumer by the
manufacturer and since an implied tort warranty is not sufficient grounds
upon which to afford recovery under the UCC, the California-type court
would determine whether an implied warranty of fitness for intended use or
merchantability had arisen. Because neither the plaintiff-buyer nor any
member of his immediate family had suffered personal injury, section 2-318
would not afford recovery from the remote manufacturer.1 68
An Ohio court would first look to privity. Finding that the purchaser and
manufacturer were not in privity, the court would, assuming causation,
structure compensation under a tort theory for breach of an implied war-
168. This result assumes that Alternative A of Code section 2-318, the Alternative adopted in
Ohio, has been adopted by the legislature of the hypothetical state.
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ranty. On the other hand, if the purchaser and manufacturer had been in
privity the UCC would be applied.
This tort/UCC dichotomy began with the Inglis 169 decision. The court in
Inglis denied recovery of economic loss in tort, but relied heavily upon San-
tor to sustain the plaintiff's action for breach of an express sales war-
ranty. 1 70 First, the court cited Santor as authority for the notion that the
absence of privity may not logically be used to deny recovery of economic
loss damage on an implied warranty since privity does not have the same
determinative effect on similar actions for personal injury:
There is no doubt that the great mass of warranty cases imposing
liability on the manufacturer regardless of lack of privity were con-
nected with personal injuries to the ultimate consumer .... But
we see no just cause for recognition of the existence of an implied
warranty of merchantability and a right to recovery for breach
thereof regardless of lack of privity of the claimant in the one case
and the exclusion of recovery in the other simply because loss of
value of the article sold is the only damage resulting from the
breach. 171
The quotation was used in Santor to describe the action for breach of
an implied warranty which arose in tort to protect injured purchasers from
the remote manufacturer's defense of lack of privity. 17 2 However, the Inglis
decision relied on the excerpt from Santor to support recovery from a re-
mote manufacturer for breach of an express warranty. Prior to Inglis, re-
covery on an express warranty had not been granted in tort in Ohio without
privity. 173 The development of the Ohio implied warranty in tort had not
been paralleled by the development of an express tort warranty. Liability on
an express warranty had been limited to contract actions where privity, al-
though relaxed somewhat by UCC section 2-318,174 remained a require-
ment. 175 Therefore, the Inglis court inappropriately applied the Santor de-
cision.
In addition, the quotation from Santor is inconsistent with Prosser's
statement, also cited by the Inglis court, that pecuniary loss is not recovera-
ble in tort.
The one kind of damage not included [in tort] is pecuniary loss. In
other words, loss of the benefit of the bargain. If somebody sells an
169. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
170. Id. at 138-40, 209 N.E.2d at 587.
171. Id. at 139, 209 N.E.2d at 587 (citation omitted).
172. 44 N.J. 52, 59, 207 A.2d 305, 308-09.
173. One exception, however, was that an express warranty was created by advertising. See
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
174. OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1962).
175. Id. § 1301.03.
[Vol. 27:683
ECONOMIC LOSS RECOVERY
automobile to a dealer and the dealer sells it to the plaintiff, and it
turns out that it is just no good as an automobile, so that having
paid let us say $3,000 for the car, the plaintiff has received $1500
worth of car and is out of pocket on a $1500 loss, that kind of
pecuniary loss is still, so far as I can see, limited to contracts be-
tween the parties, and the usual rule that for negligence there is
no liability for mere pecuniary loss of a bargain, that is apparently
carried over into this new tort [implied warranty]. 176
The Santor quotation indicates that direct economic loss may be recovered
in tort for breach of an implied warranty. Nonetheless, Prosser's remarks
cited in the Inglis opinion indicate that the UCC controls direct economic
loss. Furthermore, neither quotation is consistent with the Inglis holding.
The Inglis decision left purchasers in Ohio without a good theory of re-
covery for defective products. 17 7 The holding suggested, by negative infer-
ence, that a plaintiff "who bought the same make of car and suffered the
same damage as a result of the same defect as the car buyer in Inglis would
be denied recovery if he, in fact, had not read a national advertisement or
other written material ... about the car."178 Similarly, if a neighbor of the
plaintiff in Toni had bought the same kit and suffered an identical injury
from an identical defect, the neighbor would be denied recovery if she had
not relied upon an advertisement or other written material. Whether the
plaintiff saw and relied upon an advertisement was not a just theory of en-
terprise liability.
In Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 179 the Ohio Supreme Court realized
the potential injustice of basing compensation for personal injuries from a
remote manufacturer upon an advertisement. In Lonzrick, defective steel
roof joists, manufactured by the defendant, injured an employee of a sub-
contractor when they collapsed.18 0 The parties to the sales agreement were
the manufacturer and the general contractor of the construction pro-
ject.18' The subcontractor's relationship to the manufacturer of the defective
steel joists was comparable to the plaintiff-purchaser's relationship to the
remote manufacturer in Inglis, Santor, Seely, and Iacono: the plaintiff-
purchasers were one step removed from the manufacturer and were in priv-
ity with the intermediary with whom the manufacturer had dealt. However,
the injured individual who recovered from the remote manufacturer in
176. 3 Ohio St. 2d at 140, 209 N.E.2d at 588.
177. Strict Tort Theory, supra note 97, at 12-13 n.25.
178. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 236, 218 N.E.2d 185, 192 (1966).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 229, 218 N.E.2d at 187.
181. There was no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in Lonzrick.
Id. at 230, 218 N.E.2d at 188.
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Lonzrick was yet another step removed from the steel producer; he was the
employee of the subcontractor. By allowing the subcontractor's employee to
recover, 18 2 the Ohio Supreme Court appeared to have rejected the doctrine
of privity.
The court's effort in Lonzrick to structure a remedy to compensate an
individual who had suffered personal injury, regardless of privity or negli-
gent manufacture, suggests the adoption of strict liability in Ohio. The court
relied, in part, upon the risk of personal injury created by the defective
steel in defining the cause of action under implied tort warranty. Although
the decision did not specifically use the term "strict tort," the Lonzrick opin-
ion cited section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to support its
position.1 8 3 Furthermore, the burden of proof that the court applied in
Lonzrick 184 is identical to that required by section 402A. Dean Prosser was
sufficiently persuaded by the similarities between the Lonzrick tort and
402A strict liability to classify Lonzrick among the decisions that have
adopted the strict liability theory. 18 5
In Lonzrick the supreme court noted that the breach of a warranty con-
tained in a sales contract is controlled by the UCC.1 86 The warranty in tort,
on the other hand, arises from the nonstatutory duty of a manufacturer to
protect people from injury caused by a defective product. Although the Ohio
Supreme Court distinguished the implied tort warranty from UCC contrac-
tual warranties1 87 the UCC warranties of merchantability and fitness for in-
tended use were used by the court to define the implied tort warranty
breached in Lonzrick:
This is an action in tort for breach of an implied warranty. The
warranty in this case is the manufacturer's representation .. . that
[the products] were of good and merchantable quality, fit and safe
for their ordinary intended use.' 8
Although this decision indicated an awareness that the UCC defines con-
tract warranties as well as tort warranties, the court stated that the failure to
distinguish between the two types of warranties has caused confusion in the
law.'8 9 The court reasoned that in a "mass-distribution industrial system
... unjust technical decisions based upon outmoded and irrelevant concepts
of privity result when the sales law concept of privity is applied to all war-
182. Id. at 240, 218 N.E.2d at 194.
183. Id. at 239, 218 N.E.2d at 194.
184. Id. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192-193.
185. The Fail, supra note 53, at 795 & n.24.
186. 6 Ohio St. 2d at 239, 218 N.E.2d at 194.
187. Id. at 229-30, 218 N.E.2d at 188.
188. Id.
189. 6 Ohio St. 2d at 234, 218 N.E.2d at 190.
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ranty actions for personal injury." 19 0 Significantly, the decision does not
mention the other provisions of the sales law which, in addition to privity,
have been condemned in other jurisdictions as equally frustrating to recov-
ery for personal injury. 19 1 This narrow reasoning suggests that the Ohio tort
for breach of an implied warranty can only arise in the absence of privity, if
privity is present a UCC theory is maintainable, but if privity is not present,
the cause of action is based upon an implied tort warranty. This privity/
nonprivity approach would also explain why an express warranty (tradition-
ally a contract action) afforded recovery to a purchaser from a remote man-
ufacturer in Inglis and Toni.19 2
The Ohio Supreme Court's subsequent decision in United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equipment Co. 193 confirmed the im-
portance of privity to products liability suits in Ohio.' 94 In United States
Fidelity the plaintiff-insurer sought recovery as subrogee from the
defendant-manufacturer of a concrete truck in the amount of the claim paid
by the insurer to the insured-lessee of the truck.19s The "property damage"
occurred when a concrete mixer fell off the truck that the insured had
leased. 1 96 The lessor company had purchased the truck from the defendant.
The plaintiff claimed compensation under the UCC for breach of the defen-
dant's implied warranty of merchantability. Because no contractual relation-
ship existed between the plaintiff and defendant, the supreme court held
that the UCC was not applicable.' 9 7 The justices reasoned that in the ab-
sence of privity the plaintiff's only cause of action was for breach of implied
warranty in tort.198
The court also held that the two-year statute of limitations for tort ac-
tions' 99 was the appropriate measure of the timeliness of this plaintiffs
cause of action, rather than the four-year UCC limitation.20 0 Consequently,
the cause of action was dismissed because it had occurred more than two
years prior to the filing of the plaintiff's petition.20 '
190. Id.
191. The provisions to which -this sentence refers are the notice, disclaimer, and limitation of
liability sections of the UCC.
192. The express warranties in Inglis and Toni are unusual in that they were not made di-
rectly to the purchaser nor was reliance upon the warranty created by the advertisement re-
quired. See notes 76-79 supra.
193. 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
194. Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict Products Liability, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
772 (1970).
195. 21 Ohio St. 2d at 245-46, 257 N.E.2d at 382.
196. Id. at 245, 257 N.E.2d at 381.
197. Id. at 251, 257 N.E.2d at 384.
198. Id.
199. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1954).
200. Id. § 1302.98.
201. 21 Ohio St. 2d at 252, 257 N.E.2d at 384-85.
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After United States Fidelity, the holdings of Rogers v. Toni Home Per-
manent Co.,2 0 2 Inglis v. American Motors Corp.,20 3 and Lonzrick v. Repub-
lic Steel Corp. ,204 all of which were relied upon by the court in United
States Fidelity, can be more readily understood. The division of enterprise
liability for defective products into contract or tort causes of action depend-
ing upon privity explains why the implied warranty in Lonzrick sounded in
tort even though the warranty was defined by the UCC.2 0 5 This privity/
nonprivity approach also provides insight into why the express warranty
theory of Rogers and Inglis, a theory which has traditionally sounded in
contract, afforded recovery for personal injury and economic loss from a re-
mote manufacturer.
20 6
In Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp.20 7 the Ohio Supreme Court un-
wittingly2 08 extended the privity/nonprivity approach in warranty actions to
direct economic loss. Although the supreme court did not articulate the
privity/nonprivity dichotomy, the court did cite Lonzrick, United States
Fidelity, and Inglis-the cases from which the interpretation has been ex-
trapolated-with approval. 299 According to this interpretation, the Iacono
cause of action is in tort for breach of an implied warranty because no privity
202. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
203. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
204. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
205. See notes 186-88 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 169-78 supra and accompanying text.
207. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
208. The most viable explanation of the Iacono approach may be the court's misconstruction
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The essence of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure is fact
pleading-the plaintiff must plead all the salient facts. The court's function is to determine if
the facts support an award, not whether the "complaint contains language" addressed to the
correct theory of law. 42 Ohio St. 2d at 91, 326 N.E.2d at 269-70. Had the supreme court
construed the facts, rather than the language of the complaint, it could have granted Iacono
recovery on the breach of an express UCC warranty. The confusion of whether the UCC or
strict tort applies to loss-of-the-bargain damages would have been avoided.
The Iacono court could have construed the "language of the pleadings" and still awarded
recovery under the UCC. The language of the complaint suggested the UCC:
2. Plaintiff further says defendants expressly and impliedly warranted that such
work would be performed in a workmanlike manner and that such finished drive-
way would be fit for its customary and normal use; that plaintiff relied upon said
warranties in contracting with said defendants.
3. Plaintiff further says that said materials and work performed by the defendants
was defective and unfit for its intended use.
Id. at 90-91, 326 N.E.2d at 269 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 270-71.
The Ohio Supreme Court viewed the Inglis cause of action as the economic loss counterpart
of the Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (breach
of advertisement representations for personal injury). The Inglis opinion relied upon Judge
Zimmerman's Toni opinion to debilitate the doctrine of privity; privity was not important in
Toni because of the "modern methods of doing business." 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 137-38, 209
N.E.2d 583, 586-87 (1965).
The unanimity of the privity/nonprivity interpretation among Ohio Supreme Court cases is
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existed between Iacono and the Anderson Concrete Corporation.2 1 0 If a con-
tractual relationship had existed between the plaintiff-purchaser and the
defendant-manufacturer, the UCC would have provided the appropriate
theoretical basis of the cause of action for direct economic loss.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Iacono, Lonzrick, and United States Fidelity
defines the tort "warranty" upon which an individual may recover from a
remote manufacturer as the implicit representation of merchantability, or
fitness for "ordinary" purposes, and the representation of fitness for "in-
tended use." Thus, in all three cases the implied-in-law UCC warranties of
merchantability and fitness for intended use appear to define the tort war-
ranty which was breached. Consequently, the Ohio tort for breach of im-
plied warranty is not section 402A strict tort liability because, as comment in
of that section insists, strict tort liability is not defined by the provisions of
the UCC. 211 Furthermore, the privity/nonprivity interpretation precludes
the possibility that a manufacturer is strictly liable for defective products in
Ohio because privity is not an element of strict tort liability. Those jurisdic-
tions which have accepted the section 402A approach have held the seller of
a defective product liable even in the presence of a contractual relationship.
Strict tort liability entails fiscal responsibility for defective products,
without privity and without consideration of negligent manufacture. While
other jurisdictions equate the tort action for breach of an implied warranty
with strict liability for personal injury, 212 this is not done in Ohio. The im-
plied tort warranty of Lonzrick and Iacono is distinct from strict liability.
Because privity is the determinative factor, manufacturers cannot be strictly
liable for personal injuries and direct economic loss in Ohio. Therefore,
Lonzrick is misplaced among the decisions which have adopted strict tort
liability for personal injuries. 213
The difficulties inherent in the privity/nonprivity approach are dem-
onstrated by an Ohio court of appeals' interpretation of Lonzrick, Inglis, and
United States Fidelity. In Avenell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.214 the
court of appeals declared that: (1) an implied warranty in tort could not be
relied upon to afford recovery of economic loss damages,2 1 5 and (2) sophisti-
further suggested by the fact that Justice Herbert, who concurred in Lonzrick and United States
Fidelity, wrote the Inglis and Iacono opinions.
It is ironic that Ohio has retained the privity doctrine to determine a seller's liability for
personal injuries and economic loss. Ohio had been a leader in the repudiation of privity in
instances when defective foods or products intended for intimate bodily use caused injury. See
note 73 supra.
210. Id. at 88, 326 N.E.2d at 268.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m at 356 (1965).
212. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
213. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
214. 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
215. Id. at 156, 158-59, 324 N.E.2d at 588-89.
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cated corporations which dealt at arm's length in the manufacture and sale of
specialized equipment with which both parties were familiar could not avail
themselves of the implied tort warranty theory. 216
The subrogees of an electric utility company filed suit against the man-
ufacturer of an allegedly defective turbine generator seeking recovery of
consequential economic losses.2 1 7 The terms of the contract between the
purchaser and the manufacturer excluded claims for breach of implied war-
ranty, limited remedies to repair and replacement, and expressly excluded
liability for consequential damages. 218 The appellate court denied recovery
under the UCC, since it found that the language of the disclaimer and limi-
tation of liability clauses was valid under section 2-316 of the Code. 219 Be-
cause a tort action is not subject to contractual disclaimers and limitations of
liability, dictum in the Avenell decision indicated that the court was empow-
ered to allow recovery for breach of an implied warranty.2 20 The court,
however, refused to grant recovery and instead held that economic loss is
not recoverable in a tort action for breach of implied warranty. 22 '
The court summarily concluded that in Ohio the tort action for breach of
an implied warranty is actually strict liability.222 To support its conclusion
the court relied solely upon a law review article which was published soon
after Lonzrick, but before the important United States Fidelity deci-
sion.22 The court in Avenell then denied the recovery of economic loss
under the Ohio implied tort warranty. As explanation, the court cited Justice
Traynor's dictum in Greenman that only personal injury may be compen-
sated under strict tort theory and a quotation from Prosser that economic
loss is most appropriately recovered under the UCC.2 24 The court warned
that expansion of the implied warranty cause of action to economic loss
would render the UCC useless and impinge upon the freedom to con-
tract. 225
Although the Avenell opinion appeared to equate the Ohio implied tort
warranty with strict liability, the court admitted that "implied warranty in
tort is ordinarily applied where the purchaser is not in privity with the sel-
216. Id. at 158-59, 324 N.E.2d at 589.
217. Id. at 152, 324 N.E.2d at 585.
218. Id. at 152-53, 324 N.E.2d at 585-86.
219. Id. at 155, 324 N.E.2d at 587. The court's discussion of the UCC, not relied upon in
the discussion which follows in the text of this Note, is not entirely correct. First, the court's
definition of "conspicuous" is inaccurate, and second, the determination of whether the lan-
guage in the contract was conspicuous is an issue of law, not fact.
220. Id. at 156, 324 N.E.2d at 587.
221. Id. at 156, 324 N.E.2d at 588.
222. Id.
223. Note, Products Liability: A Synopsis, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 551 (1969).
224. 41 Ohio App. 2d at 157, 324 N.E.2d at 588.
225. Id. at 157--58, 324 N.E.2d at 588.
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ler." 2 26 This supports the theory that the Ohio tort warranty is not strict tort
liability in which privity would play no part. The opinion also contains dic-
tum that strict liability is not available to "sophisticated" consumers who
bargain at arm's length for specialized equipment which is "familiar to both
buyer and se2er. ' 227 The limitation of implied warranty theory to knowl-
edgeable "buyers and sellers'" is essentially a denial of strict tort theory in
cases where privity is present, because buyers and sellers are, by definition,
in contractual privity.
It is unclear from the Avenell opinion whether recovery on an implied
warranty is only denied sophisticated parties where the loss is consequential
economic damage, or whether personal injury claimed by a knowledgeable
individual from another sophisticated party is also precluded from recovery.
If Avenell excludes sophisticated purchasers from implied warranty actions
for recoupment of personal injury, the alternative would be recovery for
personal injuries under sales law. That result, however, would not be consis-
tent with the strict tort reasoning of Greenman which the Avenell court
adopted. 228
In addition, the Avenell case contradicts the holding of lacono. The court
in Avenell expressly refused to grant recovery of consequential economic loss
in tort,229 but in lacono recovery for direct economic loss was granted in
tort. 230 The contradiction could be explained by noting the difference be-
tween the consequential economic loss sought in Avenell and the direct
economic loss sought in lacono. However, because Iacono 2 3 1 and Avenell 23 2
agree that property damage is recoverable in tort, a more viable explanation
is that the Ohio Supreme Court simply mislabeled the damage in
Iacono.233 The lacono court did not intend to rule on the recoverability of
direct economic loss in tort; it did not even address economic loss. Nonethe-
less, this inconsistency and the retention of the privity issue by the court in
lacono have important ramifications for products liability law in Ohio.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE IACONO DECISION
Because the loss suffered by Iacono was direct economic loss, not "prop-
erty damage," the Iacono decision does not definitively decide whether
226. Id. at 158, 324 N.E.2d at 589 (emphasis original).
227. Id. at 159, 324 N.E.2d at 589.
228. Id. at 157, 324 N.E.2d at 588.
229. Id.
230. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 93, 326 N.E.2d 267, 271.
231. Id.
232. 41 Ohio App. 2d at 158-59, 324 N.E.2d at 589.
233. The court of appeals in Avenell states that injury to "'persons or property" is recoverable
in tort. But in a footnote, the court notes that "[tihe weight of authority from other jurisdictions
is to the effect that consequential damages may not be recovered under a strict tort liability
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economic loss in Ohio will be exclusively recoverable on tort or under the
UCC. Yet, since both purchasers and manufacturers desire to accurately
predict their legal rights and obligations, the theory which controls economic
loss in Ohio is of particular interest. However, by failing to clearly embrace
either of the alternative theories of direct economic loss, Iacono has pre-
cluded an accurate assessment by Ohio manufacturers and purchasers of
their rights and obligations. 234
The Inglis opinion is not helpful because that cause of action was defined
by contractual limitations 235 and it was only in dictum that the decision indi-
cated that recovery of economic loss in tort should be prohibited.2 36  Fur-
thermore, recovery of economic loss on an express warranty theory as in
Inglis should be distinguished from the Iacono tort because under the Ohio
court of appeals' reasoning in Avenell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 237 an
action for breach of express warranty is controlled by the UCC.
Economic loss is recoverable under article 2 of the UCC."8 Dealers of
goods who come within the meaning of the term "merchants" in section
2-104 239 sell their wares subject to two implied-in-law warranties: the sec-
tion 2-314 implied warranty of merchantability, 240 and the section 2-315
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 241 Unless the sale is
excluded or modified under section 2-316,242 every merchant sells his prod-
ucts with a guarantee of merchantability. The dealer thereby warrants that
the item will "pass without objection in the trade" and that it is "fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 243 The implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose arises "[w]here the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods." 244 Both warranties may be excluded or
modified, but section 2-316 requires disclaimers of warranties to be con-
theory in the absence of personal injuries." Id. at 159, 324 N.E.2d at 589 & n.8. These state-
ments substantiate the contention that economic loss is not equivalent to "property damage" in
Ohio.
234. Idaho is another state which appears to have defined products liability actions according
to the presence or absence of contractual privity. See Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho
674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Robinson v. Williamson Idaho Equip. Co., 94 Idaho 819, 498 P.2d
1292 (1972).
235. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 137-40, 209 N.E.2d 583, 586-88 (1965).
236. Id. at 140-41, 209 N.E.2d at 588.
237. 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 157-58, 324 N.E.2d 583, 588 (1974).
238. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.88, 1302.89 (Page 1962).
239. Id. § 1302.01.
240. Id. § 1302.27.
241. Id. § 1302.28.
242. Id. § 1302.29.
243. Id. § 1302.27.
244. Id. § 1302.28.
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spicuously written into the sales agreement. Section 2-714 describes the
remedies which are available to redress a breach of warranty.2 45 Damages
which are "incidental" and "consequential" to the breach, as these terms are
defined by section 2-715,246 are recoverable; a buyer's incidental and conse-
quential damages are economic losses.
Because the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose arise between the direct parties to the sale, the "buyer" and the
"seller," privity appears to be a requirement. However, the privity doctrine
has been relaxed by section 2-318.247 Ohio has adopted Alternative A of
section 2-318 which displaces privity if the remote party is a family member
or household guest of the immediate purchaser of the defective product.
This section would not afford recovery where, as in Iacono, an intermediary
dealer separates the manufacturer-defendant and the purchaser-plaintiff.
However, the scheme of the Code, as expressed by comment 3 to section
2-318, is to allow case law to define the class of people, beyond the im-
mediate purchaser, who may claim the benefit of a sales warranty. 248 Ac-
cordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court was empowered by the UCC to grant
Iacono recovery for direct economic loss from the remote manufacturer,
even though he had purchased the defective concrete from a retailer. The
plaintiff-purchaser could have been made the beneficiary of the implied and
express sales warranties made pursuant to the contract between the man-
ufacturer and the retailer.
In Iacono, the plaintiff-purchaser could also have recovered as a third
party beneficiary to the sales warranty of fitness for particular use or
mechantability 49 on the basis that the Anderson Concrete Corporation had
warranted the concrete to Padovan, but it had breached the warranty by
selling a product which was not fit for its intended use.2 5 0 Under this theory,
the courts would have the power to determine who the beneficiaries of the
sales warranties would be, but the beneficiary's rights would be subject to
the contractual limitations of the Code, including the requirement of notice
and the power to limit or disclaim liability. 251 Although contractual limita-
245. Id. § 1302.88.
246. Id. § 1302.89.
247. Id. § 1302.31.
248. The purpose of Alternative A of section 2-318 is described as follows in comment 3:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the
family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in this form
is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on
whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other
persons in the distributive chain.
(emphasis added).
249. See generally Note, Status of the Law of Privity in Connection with Third Party Ben-
eficiaries in Ohio, 3 CAP. U.L. REv. 344 (1974).
250. 42 Ohio St. 2d at 92, 326 N.E.2d at 270.
251. See note 248 supra and accompanying text.
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tions would frustrate recovery for personal injuries, they are deemed neces-
sary in the commercial setting for which the Code was designed to preserve
the freedom to contract.
In view of the fact that the UCC controls commercial transactions in
Ohio, direct economic loss which arises in a commercial context is properly
controlled by the Code. Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court would have
been bound by the UCC had they recognized that the loss suffered was
economic loss rather than property damage. Although it can only be conjec-
tured what the court would have done had it recognized the damage as
economic loss, the description in Iacono of the standard which must be met
to prove a product is defective persuasively suggests the UCC.
In Lonzrick, United States Fidelity, and Iacono a "defective product" was
defined in terms of the UCC provisions on merchantability and fitness for its
intended use. In Lonzrick, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the remote
manufacturer "impliedly warranted that [the steel joists] were fit for the or-
dinary purposes for which such steel roof joists are used." 252 The court de-
fined "defective" in terms of the UCC warranty of merchantability: "Those
joists were defective because they were not fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such joists are used." 253 The opinion also specifically cited the rele-
vant UCC section of the Ohio Revised Code in defining "merchantabil-
ity." 25 4 The court in Iacono cited Lonzrick with approval in defining the
Ohio tort for breach of implied warranty. 255 Therefore, the UCC definition
was used to define "defective" in the Iacono tort for economic loss, just as it
was in the Lonzrick tort for personal injury.
The Lonzrick decision has been construed as upholding strict tort liabil-
ity.2 5 6 If Iacono is merely an extension of the Lonzrick tort theory to
economic loss, then the Ohio court may have adopted strict liability for
economic loss as well as personal injury. In view of the court's approval of
the reasoning in Santor v. A & M Kairagheusian, Inc.,257 this strict tort
interpretation is credible. However, the effect of having two different, but
credible, enterprise liability theories for direct economic loss, rather than
isolating a single theory, is confusing 258 because of the differences between
252. 6 Ohio St. 2d at 230, 218 N.E.2d at 187.
253. Id.
254. Id. This definition may be found in Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27 (Page 1962).
255. 42 Ohio St. 2d at 91, 326 N.E.2d at 269-70.
256. See Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict Products Liability, 21 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 722, 778 (1970).
257. 42 Ohio St. 2d at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 270.
258. See generally Shanker, supra note 256; Strict Tort Theory, supra note 97; Comment,
The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a
Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 145 (1972); Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 4;
Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort
or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. 11Ev. 539 (1966).
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the UCC and strict liability defenses and statutes of limitation. If the United
States FidelitylLonzrick privity interpretation does define enterprise liability
in Ohio, the UCC would control economic losses among parties in privity;
strict tort, alternatively labeled implied tort warranty, would control liability
for economic loss if privity were not present.
A. Defenses
A products liability action for breach of an implied tort warranty is the
one "warranty" action where contractual limitations have not been ap-
plied. 2 9 Because this warranty sounds in tort rather than in contract, lack of
privity, disclaimers, and the failure to satisfy notice requirements are not
valid defenses. 26 0 However, the UCC warranty guarantees are subject to
contractual defenses that may apply to the Ohio hybrid implied warranty
action.
Disclaimers, which previously frustrated compensation for defective-
product-caused injury under implied warranty theory, are no longer so
formidable. Section 2-719 of the UCC allows a manufacturer to limit his lia-
bility for economic loss. 261 However, section 2-316 requires that the con-
tract must fairly apprise the purchaser of the risk of limited or disclaimed
liability. 262 This section also requires that discliimers be conspicuously writ-
ten. 26 3 Moreover, the purchaser is protected by section 2-302 which pro-
hibits unconscionable disclaimer or limitation clauses. 26 4 Such statutory flex-
ibility is characteristic of the UCC notice and privity provisions.
UCC section 2-607 (3) (a) states that "[w]here a tender has been ac-
cepted the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy." 26 5 Comment 4 of this section indicates that the reasonable time
standard should be loosely construed because the notice requirement "is
designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not deprive a good faith consumer
of his remedy."'2 66 Section 2-318 extends the benefit of express or implied
warranty beyond the immediate buyer, to remedy personal injuries suffered
by foreseeable third parties as a result of the breach of warranty. 2 67 In addi-
tion, comment 3 notes that the provision was intended to allow a wide de-
259. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 98, at 656-58 (4th ed. 1971).
260. The Fail, supra note 53, at 829-32.
261. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.93 (Page 1962).
262. Id. § 1302.29.
263. Id.
264. id. § 1302.15.
265. Id. § 1302.65 (C) (1).
266. Id. comment 3.
267. Id. § 1302.31.
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gree of judicial latitude to determine the scope of the class which could
bring suit for breach under section 2-318.
However, manufacturers could not rely upon these provisions of the
UCC if strict liability were extended to economic loss in Ohio. The flexibil-
ity of the UCC compares favorably to that afforded by strict tort liabil-
ity.268 In view of the power granted courts under the UCC to prevent these
defenses from denying a good faith purchaser's compensation, there is no
reason for Ohio to look beyond its statutory sales law. Although a plaintiff's
chance of recovery under the Code is comparable to his chance under strict
tort theory, the UCC accomplishes this result without leaving the defendant
defenseless. Notice, disclaimer, and privity provide stronger defenses than
the available tort defenses-misuse of the product and assumption of risk.269
B. Statute of Limitations
The Ohio Supreme Court has not discussed whether future Ohio cases
for direct economic loss should apply the Code's four-year statute of lim-
itations 270 or the two-year tort statute of limitations. 271 In United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equipment Co.,272 the Ohio
Supreme Court applied the two-year statute of limitations to determine a
remote seller's liability for property damage caused by a defective prod-
uct.273 The tort statute was used since the absence of privity caused the
court to classify the plaintiff's action as a tort for breach of implied war-
ranty.274 The decision in United States Fidelity implies that the two-year
tort limitation could also be applied to the Iacono-type implied tort warranty
for economic loss, but the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Santor
268. Strict Tort Theory, supra note 97.
269. Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REv.
267; Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty,
52 MINN. L. REv. 627 (1968); Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 924 (1969).
Because strict liability arises without negligence, it is not relevant that the defect may have
arisen because of the manufacturer's negligence. Consequently, contributory negligence is not a
valid defense in a strict liability action. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972); Comment, Products Liability:
For the Defense-Contributory Fault, 33 TENN. L. REv. 464 (1966). See also Feinberg, The
Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39 (1975); Freedman, The
Comparative Negligence Doctrine Under Strict Liability: The Defendant's Conduct Becomes
Another "Proximate Cause" of Injury, Damage or Loss, 1975 INS. L.J. 468.
270. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1) (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (A) (Page 1962)).
271. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1954).
272. 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
273. Id. at 252, 257 N.E.2d at 384-85.
274. The United States Fidelity decision was based upon the following reasoning:
In the instant case, since there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant, ... the four-year statute of limitations in the Uniform Commer-
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applied the Code's four-year statute of limitations to the tort action for
breach of an implied warranty. 275 The same court in Rosenan v. New
Brunswick,2 76 however, held that strict liability actions for personal injury
are subject to the two-year tort statute of limitations. The Santor opinion,
when considered in conjunction with Rosenau, suggests that the Code's stat-
ute of limitations applies to actions for economic loss on a tort warranty as
well as on a UCC warranty, but that actions for personal injury sound exclu-
sively in tort. However, since the damage claimed in United States Fidelity
was personal injury, United States Fidelity is not conclusive on whether a
two- or four-year limit applies to the Ohio implied tort warranty for recovery
of economic loss. 277
Because the Iacono opinion mistakenly addressed property damage-a
traditional area for recoupment in tort-rather than economic loss, the deci-
sion should not be construed as having decided in favor of the two-year tort
statute for economic loss recovery. The apparent New Jersey distinction be-
tween the tort limitation on personal injury cases and the UCC limitation on
economic loss actions may also apply in Ohio.
cial Code, Section 1302.98, Revised Code, applicable to contracts for sale, does not
apply.
The petition in the instant case alleges an action in tort based upon the breach of
an implied warranty, which warranty arises from the duty assumed by the
manufacturer-seller of a product by reason of his implicit representation of good and
merchantable quality and fitness for the intended use when he sells the product,
where the injury to a person or to property could be reasonably anticipated, even
though the manufacturer-seller had no contractual relationship with the person in-
jured or with the owner of the property injured.
Id. at 251-52, 257 N.E.2d at 384.
275. "Since plaintiff brought suit more than three years after his cause of action accrued, 44
N.J. 52, 56-57, 207 A.2d 305, 307, presumably the four-year statute of limitations for contracts,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-725 (1962), was applied. Although the two-year statute of limitations,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (1952), governs actions in strict liability for personal injuries, the
four-year statute of limitations apparently governs all actions for purely economic losses, irres-
pective of the theory of recovery." Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss
in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SmFoN HALL L. REv. 145, 157 n.49
(1972).
276. 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968) (strict liability tort action accrues and two-year statute
commences to run when an injury occurs, not when the product is delivered).
277. It has been suggested that in Ohio, despite the United States Fidelity holding that the
two-year statute of limitations is applicable to the implied tort warranty, the manufacturer-seller
who originally placed the product into the market will be potentially liable for four years.
The irony of the United States Fidelity decision is that it overlooked the fact that a
plaintiff need not necessarily sue the remote manufacturer-seller who originally
placed the defective goods in the stream of commerce. Instead, that plaintiff could
typically sue a party in the distributive marketing chain closer to him, such as the
retailer, who handled the defective goods. After the retailer pays the judgment to
the injured plaintiff, the retailer could then sue to recover his loss over from the
wholesaler. In turn, the wholesaler could then sue to recover over from the man-
ufacturer whose original sale of the defective goods actually caused the problem. In
this last action between the wholesaler and manufacturer, the suit will be between
,parties in privity with each other. As such, "contract" will be the appropriate
pigeonhole for this suit and the 4-year UCC statute of limitations will apply. Thus,
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Another important statute of limitations issue is the date from which the
absolute time requirements begin to run. UCC section 2-725 (1) states that
the four-year limit begins when the cause of action accrues. 278 Under the
Code, a "cause of action accrues when a breach of warranty occurs, regard-
less of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." 279 Recovery
for direct economic loss is based on the premise that the loss arose because
the product was defectively constructed by the defendant. 280 Thus, an ac-
tion under UCC theory would accrue from the date the warranty was
breached by the sale of a defective product. However, a two-year tort limit
would not begin to run until the defect was manifested. 28 ' In an action for
personal injury, the application of the two-year statute of limitations from
the date of injury rather than the four-year limit from the date of sale is
more just; the injury-causing accident may not occur within the first four
years that the injured individual owns the defective product. Where the
despite United States Fidelity's adoption of a 2-year statute of limitations for "tort"
cases, the manufacturer-seller who originally placed the defective goods in the
stream of commerce typically will, as a result of this series of lawsuits, continue to
be responsible for them for the full 4 years contemplated by section 2-725 of the
UCC. It, therefore, makes little sense that that same seller should not be equally
liable for the same full 4 years in a direct action by the remote (not in privity)
plaintiff who actually suffered the injury.
Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict Products Liability, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 772,
776-77 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the remote manufacturer is liable to his immediate purchaser in the distributive chain
for four years. Therefore, allowing the remote purchaser to sue the manufacturer directly would
only serve to reduce the number of suits required before recovery is exacted from the party
responsible for the defective product. For example, Iacono could have sued the Padovan Con-
struction Company for loss of the bargain, and Padovan could have sued the Anderson Concrete
Corporation. Each plaintiff would in turn have recovered under the UCC implied warranty
sections. However, the same result could have been accomplished in Iacono under the UCC if
the court had construed the section 2-318 privity requirement pursuant to comment 3 to sec-
tion 2-318. Although the Iacono decision accomplished the same judicial efficiency, it did so in
tort, thereby sacrificing the certainty and uniformity provided by the UCC.
278. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1) (OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (A) (Page 1962)).
279. Id. § 2-725 (2) (OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (B) (Page 1962)).
280. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965). Although the initial determination of whether the loss arose
because of the defect in the product is identical under both the strict tort and the UCC
theories, the impact of that threshold determination differs under each theory. For example, in
Seely v. White Motor Co., 6 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), the manufacturer
warranted that the truck it had manufactured would be "free from defects in material and
workmanship under normal use and service." Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
Thus White Motor was held responsible for the loss that "proximately resulted" (U.C.C. §
2-715 (2)(b)) from the breach of warranty. White would not have been liable if it had not
warranted the truck. However, under strict tort theory, once the defective character of the
product is established, the manufacturer is liable regardless of whether or not it had actually
agreed that the truck would perform as the plaintiff expected. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
281. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1954): "An action for... injuring personal
property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose."
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injury is loss of the bargain or out-of-pocket expense, there is no such objec-
tion to applying the Code limit. A lapse of time greater than four years from
the purchase date would justify the assumption that the product had not
been defectively manufactured. 2 8 2 Also, the burden on the manufacturer
would be vastly increased if the tort limit were applied. Even if risk distri-
bution is effected through higher prices, it is questionable whether con-
sumers should have to absorb the cost of damages for loss of the bargain of a
ten-year-old product from an action filed within two years of that item's
demise . 2 83
VI. CONCLUSION
The confusion and incongruities which have arisen as a result of the
Iacono opinion evidence the inappropriateness of overlooking a state statute
to construct a remedy. The remote purchaser's recovery in Iacono was not
expressly granted according to strict tort liability, nor was it specifically al-
lowed under UCC theory. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision represents a
third theory of recovery of economic loss. The Ohio theory is based upon
privity, but the theory is a hybrid of strict tort and UCC warranty provi-
sions. The Ohio Supreme Court decisions which preceded Iacono indicate
that in the absence of privity an Ohio case for economic loss damages would
be decided as if it were a strict tort, but in the presence of privity the UCC
would control.
Injury from loss of the bargain arises from an arms-length transaction.
The UCC embodies a legislative judgment that transactions which occur in
such a commercial context should be decided according to the Code. Fur-
thermore, liability for loss of the bargain is limited to the purchase price of
the item. The policy reasons for strict tort liability for personal injury, in-
cluding risk distribution, are not served by the Ohio tort. A remote man-
ufacturer should not be held liable for having induced consumer expecta-
tions since his ability to forecast defects is no greater than that of the pur-
chaser.
282. Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"
Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 545-46 (1966).
283. In Seely, discussed in text accompanying notes 146-62 supra, the California Supreme
Court refused to apply the policy rationale for strict liability in personal injury cases to cases in
which the defective product caused economic loss:
The rationale of [strict liability for personal injury) ... rests... on the proposition
that "[t he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business." That rationale in no way justifies requiring the consuming public to pay
more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that
some of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his customers.
63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
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The UCC is preferable to the confused tort approach, but it is not ideal.
The private consumer should not be held to the same standards as those
who truly bargain at arms length. A consumer can and should pick his seller
and the warranty terms of his agreement carefully, but his bargaining power
is limited. A private individual cannot bargain equally with a large corporate
entity for sophisticated equipment of which he has little or no knowledge.
The present UCC standards for loss of the bargain in Ohio should not be
disregarded in products liability suits. The legislature should adopt an
alternative construction of section 2-318 to broaden the group of individuals
who may recover from a remote manufacturer. Such an approach to privity
has been particularly attractive in personal injury cases, where the require-
ment of privity has most blatantly frustrated compensation.
The liability of manufacturers and retailers for defective product-caused
damages represents an added business cost. In order to accurately assess
operating costs, an enterprise must know what levels of the distribution
chain are liable for defective products and to whom these levels are liable.
Legal rights and obligations which are sufficiently specific to afford predict-
ability are essential in a dynamic business community. Accordingly, liability
for economic loss, even if it is uniformly defined by the UCC, is preferable
to the case-by-case, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach of the presently
developing theory of strict tort liability.
JoHN E. LYNCH, JR.
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